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PAY FOR PERFORMANCE, QUALITY
OF CARE AND THE REVITALIZATION
OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT
Devin S. Schindlert
I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal government is in the process of fundamentally chang-
ing the rules of engagement with the healthcare entities it regulates.
Confronted with rising costs,' the Federal government is fomenting a
quiet revolution in how doctors and hospitals are paid and regulated.
At the forefront of this revolution are two trends, one punitive, and
one incentive based, which will require healthcare providers to rethink
the way they do business. Over the last ten years, the Federal gov-
ernment has dramatically increased its enforcement activities, both
criminal and civil, in an effort to essentially force healthcare providers
to improve the quality of care they provide. This trend is balanced by
initiatives broadly know as "pay for performance," which seek to
improve the overall quality of medical care by giving healthcare
providers a financial incentive to improve their services. The combi-
nation of these two trends is going to substantially alter the legal and
risk environment for all healthcare providers.
Since at least 1997, the Federal government has used its expansive
powers under the various Medicare and Medicaid enabling acts to
become increasingly involved in dictating the quality of care that must
be provided by healthcare professionals. In a series of high visibility
t Associate Professor, Thomas M Cooley School of Law; J.D. University of
Michigan Law School 1986, Magna Cum Laude, Order of the Coif; B.A. James Mad-
ison College and the Honors College at Michigan State University.
1 The statistics speak largely for themselves. Medicare spending has grown
nearly 1200% in 17 years, from $37 billion in 1980 to $432 billion in 2007.
MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM'N, A DATA BOOK: HEALTHCARE SPENDING
AND THE MEDICARE PROGRAM 10 (2008), available at http://www.medpac.gov/
documents/Jun08DataBookEntirereport.pdf. The trustees of the Medicare program
project that Medicare spending will grow from about 3 percent of gross domestic
product today to 7.1 percent by 2036. Id. at 14. Of the $1.76 trillion spent on health
care in the United States in 2006, public programs-including Medicare, Medicaid,
SCHIP, and other programs-accounted for 46 percent of health care spending. Id. at
5.
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criminal and civil prosecutions, focused primarily on nursing homes,
the Federal government has taken the position that it can use the vari-
ous anti-fraud statutes directed at billing fraud as a tool to prosecute
healthcare professionals and facilities for providing substandard care.
The primary tool being used by the government is the False
Claims Act ("FCA"), a civil war era statute designed to eradicate
fraudulent claims by government contractors. In essence, the
government has transformed this "enforcement tool" directed at bill-
ing practices into a "regulatory tool" to force facilities to provide a
higher quality of care. The government's enforcement activities have
been supplemented by any number of "private attorney general"
actions brought under the FCA's qui tam provisions. In doing so, the
Federal government has begun to supplant the bodies that traditionally
defined quality, such as state licensing boards and the tort system,
with what is in essence a federally dictated standard of care.
The use of fraud statutes to impose a federal standard of care is
well entrenched. The second trend, known in the popular vernacular
as "pay for performance," is less well defined. As part of the Medi-
care Modernization Act of 2003, the Center for Medicare and Medi-
caid Services ("CMS") 2 was directed by Congress to explore options
for aligning performance with payment in the Medicare Program.3
This dictate has resulted in a flurry of experimental programs, primar-
ily in the hospital setting, to tie reimbursement levels directly to the
quality of care being provided. All indications suggest that these
initiatives will be migrating to other segments of the healthcare
market, including nursing homes, home healthcare providers and indi-
vidual physicians.
At first glance, these two trends appear distinct. That appearance
is deceiving. Both trends rely on a baseline of "quality" or "standard
of care" to determine (1) what facilities will get paid for their services,
and (2) more ominously, what facilities will get prosecuted or sued for
failing to meet that baseline. In both cases, the Federal government is
essentially using its enforcement powers and "power of the purse" to
dictate the quality of care that must be provided by healthcare profes-
sionals.
The use of quality indicators to drive both reimbursement deci-
sions and enforcement actions is going to fundamentally change the
legal risk environment for healthcare facilities and require them to
undergo a reassessment of the structures they have put into place to
2 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066.
3 Id. at §238.
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respond to legal risks. As a legal matter, this convergence will likely
lead to an even greater reliance by federal and state regulators on fed-
eral fraud statutes as a tool to establish quality of care standards. Over
the last several years, courts around the nation have become increas-
ingly skeptical of suits brought under the FCA that raise substantive
quality issues. Contrary to the position taken by the Federal govern-
ment, most courts have rejected the view that entitities can be held
liable under the FCA for falsely certifying that they are in compliance
with federal quality standards. Courts adopting this view have
uniformly rejected "quality" based FCA claims because compliance
with federal quality standards is not currently seen as a precondition
to receiving payment. These theories of liability, known as the
"express" and "implied" false certification theories, will be revitalized
by the pay for performance movement.
The federalization of quality standards also presents a formidable
challenge to the organizational structure of most healthcare entitities.
Most healthcare facilities have historically observed a formal distinc-
tion between their "risk" and "compliance" functions, a distinction
that was largely driven by the discrete regulatory roles played by
states and the Federal government. Historically, the states, in
conjunction with private accreditation organizations, were primarily
responsible for regulating the quality of care provided by healthcare
facilities. The states generally met this responsibility through a
combination of licensing statutes and through application of common
law malpractice standards.4 Systems such as peer review committees,
quality and utilization committees and risk managers were developed
to manage this risk.
The Federal government, in turn, was primarily responsible for
regulating payment standards and preventing billing fraud.5 This risk
was managed by most healthcare facilities by compliance committees
and compliance officers. Under the new regime, this distinction loses
meaning as "quality" and "compliance" essentially merge.
Facilities that fail to adjust to this changing environment risk
being swept away by these cross-currents.
4 For an insightful criticism of this decentralized form of quality regulation,
see COMMITTEE ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA, To ERR IS HUMAN:
BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (Linda T. Kohn, Janet M. Corrigan & Molla S.
Donaldson eds., 2000).
5 See, e.g., Michael J. Astrue, Health Care Reform and the Constitutional
Limits on Private Accreditation as an Alternative to Direct Government Regulation,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1994, at 75, 77. ("[Heath Care Financing Admini-
stration] has attempted to minimize its role as regulator through liberal use of private
contractors and private accrediting agencies.").
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II. THE HISTORIC MODEL OF
HEALTHCARE REGULATION
To fully appreciate how the trend towards pay for performance
and the federalization of quality will ultimately effect the legal envi-
ronment for healthcare providers, one must first understand how the
current system has resulted in a formal separation between the quality
and compliance functions. Most healthcare entities have organized
themselves in a fashion that reflects the differing roles historically
played by state regulators (who were primarily responsible for "qual-
ity" issues) and federal regulators (who were historically responsible
for regulating compliance with payment requirements). The quality of
care provided by healthcare professionals has historically been de-
fined by state licensing agencies and, to a lesser extent, common law
tort and malpractice standards.6 Most facilities managed this risk
through a combination of risk officers, peer review committees and
quality and utilization committees.7 Quality improvements, in turn,
were largely driven by needs identified by quality surveys performed
either by the state or private credentialing entities, or, to a lesser ex-
tent, in response to claims made in litigation.8
"Compliance," in contrast, refers to a separate category of risk in-
volving reimbursement and billing issues. In its role as the largest
healthcare payor in the nation, the Federal government has tradition-
ally taken the lead in investigating and prosecuting healthcare provid-
ers who illegally obtain payment from the various federally funded
healthcare programs. The purpose of the compliance function, as
described by the Federal government, is to insure that facilities are in
compliance with the various billing and reimbursement requirements
intended to prevent such fraudulent billing.9
6 See, e.g., Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S.
707, 719 (1985) ("[T]he regulation of health and safety matters is primarily, and
historically, a matter of local concern.").
7 As required by federal law, utilization committees are responsible for
"review[ing] professional services provided, to determine medical necessity .. " 42
C.F.R. § 482.30(f) (2007).
8 For a criticism of the traditional decentralized model of quality regulation,
see Alexander D. Eremia, When Self-Regulation, Market Forces and Private Legal
Actions Fail: Appropriate Government Regulation and Oversight is Necessary to
Ensure Minimum Standards of Quality on Long-Term Health Care, II ANNALS
HEALTh L. 93 (2002).
9 See, e.g., Draft OIG Supplemental Compliance Program Guidance for
Nursing Facilities, 73 Fed. Reg. 20,680 (Apr. 16, 2008) (noting that the primary pur-
pose of a compliance program is to "prevent[ ] the submission of erroneous claims
and... combat[ ] fraud and abuse in the Federal health care programs...").
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The entire notion of a separate compliance function dates back to
1995 when then-President Clinton announced "Operation Restore
Trust."' 0 This initiative resulted in $250 million in new federal funds
designated towards "combat[ing] fraud, waste and abuse in Medicare
and Medicaid programs."" The program paid for new auditors, inves-
tigators, and prosecutors who were assigned the task of rooting out
billing fraud."
Using new data-mining techniques, and the ever popular "whistle-
blower," Operation Restore Trust reported 74 criminal convictions,
218 exclusions, and over $187 million in "fines, recoveries, settle-
ments, audit disallowances and civil monetary penalties" in its first
two years of existence. 12  Not surprisingly, the government has
expanded its antifraud programs since Operation Restore Trust, most
recently to combat Medicaid fraud.'
3
The need for a separate compliance function was made explicit in
1998 when the CMS published its "Compliance Program Guidance
for Hospitals." This Compliance Guidance was the first in a series of
recommended compliance programs issued by CMS. Using the Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines as its model, CMS identified seven basic
compliance elements that all Hospitals should implement. Among
other things, the Guidelines emphasized the importance of designating
a "high-level" compliance officer and creating a corporate compliance
committee charged with the task of developing, operating and moni-
toring a comprehensive compliance program. 12 An additional eight
compliance guidance programs have been subsequently issued, cover-
ing, inter alia, pharmaceutical manufacturers, 13 nursing facilities 14 and
small physician offices.
15
10 See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES,




12 Fact Sheet, Operation Restore Trust Accomplishments (May 20, 1997),
http://www.os.dhhs.gov/news/press/1997pres/970520d.html.
13 The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 created a new sub-agency within CMS,
called the "Medicaid Integrity Program," which was assigned the task of implement-
ing the "first national strategy to detect and prevent Medicaid fraud and abuse in the
program's history." MEDICAID INTEGRITY GROUP, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVICES, COMPREHENSIVE MEDICAID INTEGRITY PLAN OF THE MEDICAID
INTEGRITY PROGRAM: FY 2006 - 2010 2, 4 (2006), available at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/DeficitReductionAct/Downloads/CMIP%201nitial%2OJuly%
202006.pdf,
120 OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Hospitals, 63 Fed. Reg. 8987,
8993 (Feb. 23, 1998).
13 OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 68
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A decade ago the distinction between the "quality" function and
the "compliance" function was essentially static. A new malpractice
case went to the Risk Department and, potentially, to the Peer Review
Committee. Quality and utilization kept an eye on larger trends with-
in the hospital that might suggest a "quality" problem in the way the
hospital was providing particular services. Compliance, in turn, oper-
ated as "an internal control in the reimbursement and payment areas"
to insure that the facility was operating in compliance with "Federal,
State and private payor health care program requirements. ... 6
Thus, a claim that procedures were being "upcod[ed]" or
"unbundle[ed]" in violation of federal law was routed to the Compli-
ance Department. 17 As a result of its limited role, compliance manag-
ers and committees were primarily responsible for managing the insti-
tution's relationship with the Federal government.
This historic separation between the "quality" and "compliance"
functions was reinforced by the economics of healthcare reimburse-
ment. Most government reimbursement programs, like the "Inpatient"
and "Outpatient" "Prospective Payment Systems" ("IPPS" and
"OPPS", respectively) focus exclusively on either the nature of the
service being provided (OPPS), or on the presenting diagnosis (IPPS)
as the sole basis for determining reimbursement levels. 18 The under-
lying quality of the service being provided-traditionally a state
concern-was irrelevant to the reimbursement decision. Thus, the
leading cardiac surgeon in the nation would be paid the exact same
amount as the worst cardiac surgeon for placement of a stent, even if
the latter was under trained and had a high failure rate.
The same is true in the payment structure for Skilled Nursing
Facilities, which are paid "per diem" based on patient count irrespec-
tive of the level of services provided.' 9 Thus, the nursing facility that
serves gruel to its patients is paid the same amount as one that special-
izes in the finest French Cuisine. These kinds of payment systems,
Fed. Reg. 23,731 (May 5, 2003).
14 OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Nursing Facilities, 65 Fed. Reg.
14,289, 14,289 (Mar. 16, 2000).
15 OIG Compliance Program for Individual and Small Group Physician Prac-
tices, 65 Fed. Reg. 59,434, 59,434 (Oct. 5, 2000).
16 OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Hospitals, 63 Fed. Reg. at 8988.
17 "Upcoding" occurs when a facility submits a bill for a higher reimbursing
service than what was actually provided. Id. at 8990 n.15. "'Unbundling' is the
practice of submitting bills piecemeal... to maximize the reimbursement for various
tests or procedures that are required to be billed together .. " Id. at 8990 n.20.
18 The IPPS is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww (2000 & Supp. V 2005). The
statutory basis for the OPPS is located at 42 U.S.C. § 13951(t)(9).
'9 42 U.S.C. § 1395yy(e)(l)-(12).
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which focus exclusively on objective criteria (i.e. the number of
patients or the nature of the service) create a disincentive to provide
the highest (and potentially most expensive) level of care.
Under this system, there is little incentive to integrate the compli-
ance and quality functions. Compliance departments needed only to
focus on fraudulent billing claims, irrespective of the quality of care
being provided. Thus, the vast majority of fraud cases historically
brought under either the False Claims Act or the various federal fraud
statutes 20 involved either "upcoding," "unbundling," or "fictitious
patients or procedures.' What all three of these have in common is
the absence of any subjective inquiry into the quality of the service
provided. Either all five digits of a hand were replaced by a hand
surgeon, or they weren't. Either the patient received a level "3" eval-
uation and management, or he didn't. The question of the underlying
quality of the service being provided was simply not the compliance
department's concern.
A compliance department during this milieu had little reason to
trouble itself with the activities of its risk, quality or utilization
departments. Revenue departments were also outside of this loop,
until such a time that the compliance department determined that
reimbursement was necessary. Conversely, the quality, utilization and
peer review departments had no particular reason to keep the compli-
ance staff informed about investigations into doctors who were
providing inadequate care. Quality was "care," compliance was
"billing," and never the twain shall meet.
III. CHALLENGE ONE TO THE HISTORIC MODEL:
THE USE OF FEDERAL FRAUD STATUTES TO
IMPOSE QUALITY STANDARDS
The traditional model of healthcare regulation-and the organiza-
tional structures it engendered-is under attack. The Federal govern-
ment has increasingly tried to leverage its control over the monies
paid to healthcare providers to essentially supplant the states and
impose a federal standard for quality of care. This control has both a
regulatory aspect, in terms of the rules that must be followed in order
20 See 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2000) (wire, radio, or television fraud), and 18
U.S.C. § 1347 (2000) (health care fraud).
21 United States v. Krizek, 111 F.3d 934, 936 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (referencing
an "up-coding" claim); see also OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Hospitals, 63
Fed. Reg. at 8990 (identifying "upcoding," "unbundling" and "DRG creep," inter
alia, as the most common forms of health care fraud).
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to participate in the program, and is reflected in how the government
has exercised its civil and criminal enforcement authority.
A. The Tools of Federal Enforcement
The government has a variety of tools in its arsenal to pursue
claims of false billing. The Medicare and Medicaid fraud statute is
the most obviously applicable, if not the most utilized, criminal provi-
sion available to federal prosecutors. Under this statute, the Federal
government may prosecute anyone who "knowingly and willfully"
makes or causes to be made a false material statement to Medicare,
Medicaid, or a state healthcare program, as part of a claim for pay-
ment.
22
Although the Medicare Fraud statute applies specifically to
healthcare providers, the Federal government is not precluded from
using other fraud statutes when prosecuting a person for making false
statements in order to obtain payments from a healthcare program.23
Other criminal statutes commonly used by the government to combat
healthcare fraud include:
1. Submitting False Claims: 18 U.S.C. § 287.
(a) Making or presenting a claim that is false, fictitious, or
fraudulent;
(b) To a department or agency of the United States; and
(c) Knowing that it is false, fictitious, or fraudulent.
2. False Statements: 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
(a) Knowingly and willfully;
(b) Making a false, material statement or concealing a mate-
rial fact or using a writing or document that is false in a mate-
rial matter; and
(c) In any manner within the jurisdiction of any department
or agency of the United States.
3. Mail Fraud: 18 U.S.C. § 1341.
(a) Devising a scheme or artifice to defraud or for obtaining
money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses;
and
(b) Use of the mails in furtherance of the scheme.
The Federal government also has expansive civil enforcement
tools. The Civil False Claims Act,24 which was originally enacted
during the Civil War to prevent widespread fraud in defense procure-
22 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a)(1).
23 See, e.g., United States v. Simon, 510 F. Supp. 232, 236-37 (E.D. Pa.
1981).
24 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2000).
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ment contracts, has metamorphosed into a major weapon in the gov-
ernment's fight against Medicare/Medicaid fraud. To prevail, the
government must establish that the healthcare provider:
(a) Presented, or caused another to present, a "claim for payment"
or "to get" payment from the United States;
(b) The claim was "false or fraudulent"; and
(c) The healthcare provider must act "knowing" that the claim
was false.25
The statute also encompasses preparation of false records to sup-
port a payment. The Act provides for a monetary fine of up to
$10,000 per false claim plus treble damages for the amount of the
claim.26
Perhaps more troubling, the FCA has a "private attorney general"
provision that allows anyone to prosecute a violation. In practical
terms, this means that disgruntled former employees, unhappy
patients, or anyone with access to a lawyer can file suit on behalf of
the government to collect the foregoing damages. A successful plain-
tiff in this kind of suit, known as a qui tam action, is normally
awarded between 25-30% of any recovery. If the government inter-
venes in the action, the bounty goes down to 15-25%, but the qui tam
relator (that is, the person who started the suit) is then freed from the
burden of prosecuting the action.27 The qui tam procedure provides
an enormous incentive for disgruntled patients or employees to inform
on healthcare providers.
The number of successful qui tam actions has escalated dramati-
cally in the last several years. Once again, the government and third
party payers have aggressively encouraged disgruntled current
employees and/or former employees to file qui tam actions. The
success of these efforts is evident from the numbers. The Office of
the Inspector General recently reported that in the first six months of
2008 it had participated in 141 civil and administrative False Claim
Act cases. Total expected recoveries from these cases exceeded $1
billion.28
The Civil Monetary Penalties Law creates an administrative
procedure that can be pursued by the government in lieu of a criminal
25 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)-(2).
26 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a).
27 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(1), (d)(1).
28 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF HEALTH & HuMAN SERVICES,





or civil action.29 Like the Civil False Claims Act, the Monetary
Penalties Law provides for penalties of up to $10,000 per false claim,
plus an assessment of up to three times the amount falsely collected.
The primary difference between this and a civil or criminal prosecu-
tion is that the matter is heard by an administrative law judge and the
defendant loses his or her right to a jury trial.
The trigger for any of these enforcement tools is essentially
submission of a claim for reimbursement for an item or service that
was either medically unnecessary or simply not provided. Prior to
1997, the vast majority of fraudulent billing cases involved a claim for
a service that was either (1) not provided, (2) not necessary, or (3) had
been "upcoded" to bill for a higher level of service than was actually
provided.30 Traditionally, the underlying quality of the service being
provided was irrelevant to the reimbursement. So long as the service
was actually provided-no matter how deficient in its execution-the
government had no basis under the various billing fraud statutes to
bring an enforcement action.
B. Liability for Providing "Worthless Services"
The formal separation between the "quality" and "compliance"
functions began to blur in 1996, when the Federal government first
began to use the FCA as a vehicle to enforce quality of care standards.
There are essentially three closely related theories of liability related
to the quality of services being provided that have been asserted under
the FCA: "Worthless service," "Express certification" and "Implied
Certification," each of which will be discussed in turn. The first,
"worthless service" is based on the notion that some services can be
so deficient in quality as to rise to the level of "no service" at all.
Since billing for a service that was not rendered is the epitome of a
FCA violation, the theory posits, liability can also attach when the
service is so deficient that it equates to "no service."
The "worthless service" theory was brought to life by the U.S.
Attorneys for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in a series of wide-
ly reported enforcement actions commencing in 1996. In 1994, an
elderly gentleman was transported from a local nursing home, "Tuck-
er House," to a local emergency room. The patient was suffering
from 26 ulcers, a gangrenous leg and a series of other serious compli-
29 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a (2000).
30 OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Hospitals, 63 Fed. Reg. 8987,
8990 (Feb. 23, 1998) (identifying an additional 18 areas of "special concern," includ-




cations. The hospital contacted the state's long term care
ombudsmen who, in turn, contacted federal officials. Typical of the
enforcement milieu of the day, the Pennsylvania Department of
Health surveyed the facility and found numerous deficiencies in the
services that were being provided.3'
After reviewing the case, the Federal government concluded that
the facility was providing inadequate dietary and wound care for its
residents. The U.S. Attorneys developed the then-novel theory that
the actions of the nursing home, in addition to violating state elder
care laws, also constituted a violation of the FCA. In February of
1996, the U.S. Attorneys' office for Philadelphia filed a civil com-
plaint against the facility and its management consultant, alleging that
the defendants had violated the FCA by submitting claims for "medi-
cally inadequate" services.32 The case was unique because the
government did not assert that the billed services were not provided,
were medically unnecessary, or even upcoded. Rather, the govern-
ment's theory was that the FCA covered the provision of medically
necessary services in a grossly negligent manner. In essence, the
government reasoned that providing "bad" service was the functional
equivalent of providing "no" service.
In early 1998, the government employed the same theory in a sec-
ond case, United States v. Chester Care Ctr., against three Pennsyl-
vania area nursing homes.33 Ultimately this case was settled, at the
cost of a $500,000 fine.34 Both cases also resulted in consent orders
that required the defendants to implement detailed and intrusive
quality care standards.
35
The principal established in these cases-that antifraud statutes
could be used to regulate quality of care issues-has been seized upon
by any number of state and federal enforcement agencies in a thinly
veiled effort to impose a "federal" standard of care on health care
31 David R. Hoffman, The Federal False Claims Act as a Remedy to Poor
Care, 45 UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' BULLETIN 54, 56-57 (1997), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia readingroom/usab4502.pdf.
32 Compl., United States v. GMS Management-Tucker, Inc., No. 96-1271
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 21, 1996); available at http://clearinghouse.wustl.edu/chDocs/
public/NH-PA-0001-0001.pdf. The case was ultimately resolved pursuant to a con-
sent decree. See Consent Order, United States v Tucker House II, No. 96-1271
(March 6, 1996), http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/pae/nursing/tucker.pdf.
33 Consent Order and Judgment, United States v. Chester Care Center, No.
98-CV-138 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
34 Id. at 3.
35 Consent Order, United States v. Tucker House II,Inc., supra note 32; Press
Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice (Jan. 13, 1998) (on file with author).
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providers.36 According to the Office of Inspector General for Health
and Human Services, between 1996 and 2003, more than 20 cases
involving quality of care issues were settled against nursing homes
based on alleged violations of the FCA.37
What started out as creative but flawed theory of billing fraud has
now been officially adopted as CMS policy. On April 16, 2008, the
Office of Inspector General formally adopted the theory first
advanced by the U.S. Attorneys of the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania:
In cases that involve failure of care on a systematic and wide-
spread basis, the nursing facility may be liable for submitting
false claims for reimbursement to the Government under the
Federal False Claims Act, the Civil Monetary Penalties Law
(CMPL), or other authorities that address false and fraudulent
claims or statements made to the Government. Thus, compli-
ance with applicable quality of care standards and regulations
is essential for the lawful behavior and success of nursing fa-
cilities.38
The distinction between "systematic and widespread malpractice,"
which, in the view of the government, gives rise to a claim for billing
fraud, and "simple malpractice," which would presumably not, is
difficult to discern. In United States v. NHC Healthcare Corp.,39 the
court ruled that a legitimate dispute over the "proper standard of care"
would not give rise to a liability under the FCA. Or, as stated by the
court in Mikes v. Straus, "the performance of the service [must be] so
deficient that for all practical purposes it is the equivalent of no
36 See United States v. United Mem'l Hosp., No. 1:01CR238, 2002 WL
33001119 (W.D. Mich. 2002); United States ex rel. Moczulski v. Kidspeace Corp.,
No. 02-1846 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (agreeing to repay between $1.8 and $1.9 million to
settle false claim action for failure to comply with state and federal regulations relat-
ing to staffing, coding and busing issues); United States v. Tenet Healthcare Corp.,
CV-03-206 (C.D. Cal. 2003); United States v. NHC Healthcare Corp., 115 F. Supp.
2d 1149 (W.D. Mo. 2000) (denying declaratory judgment on claim that a nursing
home's low staffing ratio resulted in inadequate care, in violation of the Federal
Claims Act).
37 Statement of Dara Corrigan Before the S. Finance Comm., (2003) (state-
ment of Dara Corrigon, Acting Principal Deputy Inspector General, U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services), available at http://www.oig.hhs.gov/
testimony/does/2003/071703 fin.pdf.
8 Draft OIG Supplemental Compliance Program Guidance for Nursing
Facilities, 73 Fed. Reg. 20,680, 20,683-84 (Apr. 16, 2008).
'9 115 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1155 (W.D. Mo. 2000).
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performance at all. ''4 Other commentators have suggested that the
standard lies somewhere between gross neglect and perfect care." In
the earliest cases, Tucker and its progeny, the government suggested
that liability was premised on the notion that the standard of care was
so low as to essentially equate with "no service" being provided at all.
All healthcare providers are at risk under the "worthless service"
theory. The very nature of nursing home reimbursement, however,
places such facilities at a particular risk of being targeted for tort, civil
enforcement and criminal cases under the various billing fraud
statutes. Unlike most "pay for service" schemes, Medicare and Medi-
caid pay nursing homes a "per diem" for providing a "basket" of
services. This basket, in turn, is defined by Medicare regulations with
both generality and specificity. As to the former, to qualify for Medi-
care funding, the SNF must "care for its residents in such a manner
and in such an environment that will promote ... the quality of life of
each resident" and provide services of sufficient quality to "attain or
maintain the highest practicable physical, mental and psychosocial
well-being of each resident.
'A2
These general conditions of participation, in turn, are supple-
mented and expanded by several dozen pages of regulations, which,
among other things, codify each resident's legal right to have "digni-
fied existence"; 43 to be free from "physical or chemical restraints
' 4
and to engage in therapeutic recreational activities.45 Other regula-
tions are more specific. Thus, as a condition of participation, the
facility must maintain a "Quality Assessment and Assurance Comm-
ittee" and prepare a written "plan of care" for each of its residents
based on a "comprehensive, accurate, standardized" resident assess-
ment.46
The nature of the reimbursement scheme places nursing homes at
a disadvantage in both avoiding and defending against fraudulent
quality claims. For most medical practitioners, identifying (if not de-
fining) the appropriate standard of care is relatively straightforward.
40 274 F.3d 687, 703 (2d Cir. 2001).
41 See James E. Utterback, Substituting an Iron Fist for the Invisible Hand:
The False Claims Act and Nursing Home Quality of Care - A Legal and Economic
Perspective, 10 QUINNIPIAc HEALTH L.J. 113 (2007) (suggesting a standard of gross
negligence); Accord Constantinos I. Miskis & William F. Sutton, Jr., Enforcing
Quality Standards in Long-Term Care: The False Claims Act and Other Remedies,
FLA. B. J., June 1999, at 108, 110.
42 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(b)(1)(A), (4)(A)(i) (2000).
4' 42 C.F.R. § 483.10 (2007).
44 42 C.F.R. § 483.13(a).
41 See 42 C.F.R. § 483.15(f).
46 42 C.F.R. §§ (b)(1)(B) and (b)(2-3).
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Consider this example. In the case United States v. Askanazi,47 the
defendant, a pain doctor, was prosecuted under the wire and mail
fraud statutes for, among other things management, submitting claims
for pain management services that were either medically unnecessary
or deficiently rendered.48 For the unnecessary service claims, the jury
had to answer the relatively straightforward question of whether a
particular patient really needed a particular pain treatment. The
quality-of-care claims required an analysis of how the profession
traditionally administers the single form of treatment (called the
"Racz procedure") being litigated and whether the doctor met that
standard. Ultimately, the jury concluded that Dr. Askanazi had both
billed for unnecessary services and provided those services in a gross-
ly negligent matter, finding him guilty on 33 counts of billing fraud.49
In the Askanazi case and others like it that involve distinct proce-
dures, the quality of care issue can be defined narrowly. But when
reimbursement is based on a bundle of services, defined, inter alia, as
those generally necessary to "attain or maintain the highest practicable
physical, mental and psychosocial well-being of each resident, ' 50 the
potential theories of liability and risk in general rise exponentially.
The message from NHC Healthcare, Tucker and their progeny is
that healthcare facilities which consistently fail to meet whatever
standard of care the Federal government currently considers appropri-
ate, are at risk of both malpractice claims (the traditional ambit of the
risk and quality departments) and of being charged with either civil or
criminal billing fraud.5'
47 United States v. Askanazi, Case No. 98-CRI30 (W.D. Mich. July 12,
2001).
48 Brief for Appellant at 30-31, United States v. Askanazi, 2001 WL 814940
(6th Cir. 2001).
49 See id. The author was tangentially involved in the Askanazi case; serving
as special counsel for the hospital where a majority of Dr. Askanazi's services were
performed. Materials related to the Askanazi prosecution are on file with the author.
50 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(b)(1)(A), (4)(A)(i) (2000).
51 As is too often the case where government uses its enforcement powers in
ways they were never envisioned, the law of unintended consequences applies.
According to the National Association of Board of Examiners, the number of poten-
tial nursing home administrators sitting for licensure has declined by as much as 40%
between 2000 and 2006. THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF HOMES AND SERVICES FOR
THE AGING, CMS ANNUAL LEADERSHIP SUMMIT (April 24, 2006). The American
Association of Homes and Services for the Aging has cited the expansion of LTC
enforcement initiatives as one of the primary causes of what it terms as an "exodus"
of healthcare professionals from the field. Id. This exodus occurs at a time when the
percentage of individuals over 65 who potentially will need nursing home care is
expected to double by 2026. Id.
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C. The "Express" and "Implied" False Certification Theories
The government and private litigants have relied upon two addi-
tional theories, known as the "express" and "implied" false certifica-
tion, to impose liability under the FCA for providing inadequate
service. These two theories are distinguished by the nature of the
federal regulation that has allegedly been violated. Federal regula-
tions involving quality of care fall roughly into two categories. Some
rules, such as the requirement that any procedure for which reim-
bursement is sought be medically necessary,52 are a "condition of
payment." Thus, seeking payment for unnecessary procedures (and
certifying falsely that they were in fact necessary) violates the FCA.
Other requirements, such as the requirement that the care provided by
physicians "be of a quality which meets professionally recognized
standards" 53 must be met as a condition to participate in the first in-
stance in the Medicare program.
The "express" certification theory is predicated on the fact that
every claim for reimbursement submitted by healthcare facilities
includes a certification that the services for which reimbursement is
sought were "medically indicated and necessary for the health of the
patient., 54 Private litigants, as well as the Federal government, have
argued that this condition of payment is "expressly" violated anytime
a facility submits a request for reimbursement for substandard care, on
the theory that the term "medically necessary" imposes a "quality
obligation" on the submitting facility. In essence, the "express"
certification theory equates "medical necessity" with "medical
quality."
The "implied" theory of false certification, in contrast, is premised
on the fact that facilities are required to be in "substantial" compliance
with all federal and state laws as a condition to participate in govern-
ment payment programs. To cite one of many examples, section
1156(a)(2) of the Social Security Act requires participants to insure
that all services they provide "will be of a quality which meets profes-
sionally recognized standards of health care. 55 Nursing homes are
required as a condition of participation to "[b]e in compliance with the
applicable conditions or long-term care requirements" set forth in
52 See e.g., CMS Form 1500, available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/
cmsforms/downloads/CMS 1 500805.pdf.
5' 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-5(a)(2) (2000).
54 CMS Form 1500, supra note 52; see also § 1395y(a)(1)(A) (imposing the
requirement that all services paid for by Medicare be "reasonable and necessary for
the diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury").
5 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-5(a)(2).
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subchapter IV of the Social Security regulations.56 The implied false
certification theory is based on the notion that anytime a healthcare
provider falsely certifies that it has met all of the conditions of partici-
pation, it has by definition also "impliedly" certified that it is in
"compliance with governing federal rules that are a precondition to
payment.
57
Both theories met with initial success, gaining recognition in a
troika of cases, United States ex rel. Aranda v. Cmty. Psychiatric Cen-
ters of Okla., Inc., " United States ex rel Thompson v. Columbia/HCA
Healthcare Corp.59 and United States v. NHC Healthcare Corp.60 In
the leading case, United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA
Healthcare, the qui tam relator asserted that the defendant had
violated the FCA by falsely certifying in its annual cost report that it
was in compliance with all "laws and regulations" regarding the
provision of health care services. 61  The Plaintiff asserted that this
certification was both "expressly" and "impliedly" false because the
defendant had entered into a series of Byzantine financial relation-
ships with referring physicians that violated the Stark anti-referral and
anti-kickback statutes.62  The defendant, a large integrated health
system, responded that the allegedly false statements were immaterial
because they related only to the systems' conditions of participation,
and not conditions of payment.
In rejecting the defendant's argument, the court relied extensively
on an affidavit submitted by the then acting Chief of HHS Health Care
Financing Administration, David Goldberg. In this affidavit, Mr.
56 42 C.F.R. § 488.3(a)(2) (2007).
57 Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 699 (2d Cir. 2001).
58 945 F. Supp. 1485 (W.D. Okla. 1996).
'9 20 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (S.D. Tex. 1998), on remandfrom 125 F.3d 899 (5th
Cir. 1997).
60 In United States v. NHC Healthcare Corp, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1151
(W.D. Mo. 2000) the government brought a FCA claim against a long term care facil-
ity based on the complaints of two residents, who the government alleged had devel-
oped pressure sores, incurred unusual weight loss and had experienced unnecessary
pain as a result of the facilities' "woefully low staff numbers." In addition to bringing
a "worthless service" claim, the government alleged an express certification claim.
Id. The gravamen of the government's complaint was that the facility illegally billed
the per diem charge for these patients knowing that it had not provided sufficient
services to "promote maintenance or enhancement of the quality of life." Id. at 1153,
1155 (citation omitted). In terms of the certification claims, the court ruled that an
"implied" certification claim could proceed in the very narrow situation where the
standard of care is "at the heart" of the agreement between the provider and the gov-
ernment. Id. at 1155.




Goldberg asserted that any false statement to the Federal government
gave rise to liability under the FCA, irrespective of whether the state-
ment related to a condition of payment or a condition of participa-
63 Glbr h itntotion. The Goldberg affidavit essentially blurred the distinction
between the two kinds of conditions by asserting that HCFA (now
CMS) relied on all certifications to determine both eligibility for
payment and eligibility for participation.
The momentum behind the two theories was short lived. In the
case that lead the counterrevolution, Mikes v. Straus, a disgruntled
physician alleged that the defendants had violated the FCA by per-
forming and billing for tests performed with equipment that the
defendants knew was not properly calibrated.64 The alleged failure to
properly calibrate the equipment, the plaintiff argued, rendered the
tests so unreliable as to essentially make them worthless.65 As with
any claim submitted for payment for the government, the defendants
had expressly certified when they sought payment for the tests that the
underlying services were "medically necessary." This express certifi-
cation, the plaintiff asserted, was false and therefore violated the
FCA.66
The Court rejected the express certification theory, reasoning that
the term "medical necessity" as used in the certification did not trans-
late to a quality guarantee:
The term "medical necessity" does not impart a qualitative
element mandating a particular standard of medical care....
Medical necessity ordinarily indicates the level-not the
quality-of the service.67
According to the Court, the only thing being expressly certified by
the defendant was that (1) a procedure reimbursable by Medicare was
performed, and (2) that the procedure was medically necessary. The
fact that the "quality" of the tests might not have met the applicable
standard of care, the court reasoned, was irrelevant under the FCA.
The court in Mikes also rejected the implied false certification
theory. Contrary to the position taken by CMS in Columbia Health-
care, the court found the distinction between conditions of participa-
tion and conditions of payment to be critical. The court relied heavily
on the plain language of the FCA in creating a bright line between the
63 Id. at 1042.
64 274 F.3d 687, 693 (2d. Cir. 2001).
65 Id. at 694-95.
Id. at 693.
67 Id. at 698.
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two kinds of conditions. The Act only prohibits false claims "for
payment ' 68 or "to get" payment. 69 Thus, submitting a "false state-
ment" to the government that is unrelated to payment; i.e. not neces-
sary "to get" payment, is not a violation of the act. As explained by
the court:
[T]he False Claims Act was not designed for use as a blunt in-
strument to enforce compliance with all medical regula-
tions-but rather only those regulations that are a precondi-
tion to payment-and to construe the impliedly false certifica-
tion theory in an expansive fashion would improperly broaden
the Act's reach .... [I]implied false certification is appropri-
ately applied only when the underlying statute or regulation
upon which the plaintiff relies expressly states the provider
must comply in order to be paid. 70
This distinction is logical in light of fundamental differences
between the "payment" and "participation" requirements. Payment
requirements, in a sense, are absolute. If the facility provides a medi-
cally necessary service, it gets paid. Conditions of participation, how-
ever, are both more ambiguous and, concomitantly, more flexible.
Hence, a facility needs only to certify that it is in "substantial compli-
ance" with applicable regulations to participate in the program.7'
CMS also has discretion to choose sanctions and remedies for
facilities that fall out of substantial compliance with the conditions of
participation. Under the Social Security Act, HHS has the authority to
impose a number of penalties short of outright exclusion for noncom-
pliant facilities, including civil monetary penalties, denial of payment,
and appointment of temporary management and temporary suspension
of payment.72 Allowing a False Claims suit to essentially bootstrap
the conditions of participation would inappropriately turn the FCA
into a "federal malpractice statute, 7 3 and interfere with CMS's discre-
tion to respond in a measured fashion to facilities that provide
68 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1).
69 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2).
70 274 F.3d at 699-700. The requirement that the certification be a condition
of payment has also been described in terms of "materiality." See e.g., United States
ex rel. Sharp v. Oklahoma Orthopedic Ctr., No. 05-CV-572-TCK-TLW, 2009 WL
499375 (N.D. Okla. Feb. 27, 2009) (holding certification must be "material" to the
government's payment decision).
71 42 C.F.R. § 488.330(b)(1) (2007).
72 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(h)(2)(B) (2000).
73 United States ex rel. Phillips v. Permian Residential Care Ctr., 386 F.
Supp. 2d 879, 884 (W.D. Tex. 2005) (citation omitted).
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substandard care. 74 Widespread adoption of the implied false certifi-
cation theory would supplant the regulatory discretion granted to
CMS under the Social Security Act.
Most courts that have been presented with a false certification
claim since Mikes have essentially adopted its reasoning. 75 Notwith-
standing the courts' skepticism, however, the government continues to
bring cases based upon the false certification theories. In September
of 2007, to cite one example, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a
complaint in the Southern District of Florida against an attorney who
was responsible for signing annual reports submitted on behalf of the
Tenent Healthcare Corporation that were required by a Corporate
Integrity Agreement. The government alleges that in 1997 and 1998,
the attorney signed annual reports in which she certified that the
company was in "material" compliance with all applicable federal
laws. In fact, according to the government, Tenet was aware that
certain physician contracts one of its Florida hospitals had entered into
violated the so-called Stark self-referral laws. The government is
seeking repayment of approximately $18,000,000 for claims that were
paid during the period the company falsely certified that it was in
compliance.76
D. Quality Through Direct Regulation--CMS and Program Guidance
The strongest evidence of the Federal government's intent to "fe-
deralize"--and criminalize--quality of care standards can be found in
the Compliance Program Guidance documents most recently issued
by the 01G. Beginning in 1998, CMS has periodically published
Guidance documents for various industry sectors designed to assist
facilities in developing "effective internal controls that promote
adherence to applicable Federal and State law, and the program
requirements of Federal, State and private health plans. 77 The first
Guidance document, for hospitals, focused almost exclusively on
74 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Swan v. Covenant Care, Inc., 279 F. Supp.
2d 1212, 1222 (E.D. Cal. 2002).
75 See id. at 1221-22; United States ex rel. Gross v. AIDS Research Alliance-
Chicago, 415 F.3d 601, 604 (7th Cir. 2005); United States ex rel. Cooper v Gentiva
Health Services, Inc., No 2:01 CV00508, 2003 WL 22495607 (W.D. Pa. 2003).
76 Complaint at 37, United States v. Sulzbach, No. 07-61329, 2007 WL
5078620 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 18, 2007). For a general discussion of the potential impact
of the Sulzbach case, see S. Sandra Park & Katie C. Pawlitz, False Claims Act and
False Certifications - An Old Dog with a New Trick, J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE,
May-June 2008, at 47.
77 OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Hospitals, 63 Fed. Reg. 8987,
8987 (Feb. 23, 1998).
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"compliance" in its traditional sense of insuring the proper billing,
coding and collection of government healthcare dollars. Hence, the
Program Guidance for hospitals instructed healthcare providers to
implement "internal control in the reimbursement and payment areas,
where claims and billing operations are often the source of fraud and
abuse .... 78 Hospitals were directed to provide education and per-
form audits directed at preventing "[b]illing for items or services not
actually rendered"; "[u]pcoding"; "DRG creep"; "[d]uplicate billing";
and "[f]alse cost reports. 79 The initial Guidance directives main-
tained the distinction between "quality issues"-historically a state
licensing issue-and "billing compliance." "Quality" issues were
largely an afterthought, raised largely in the context of any facilities
obligation to insure that all services being provided are medically
necessary.
80
The original Compliance Guidance for Nursing Facilities and its
recent supplement, however, evidence the Federal government's new
found interest in expanding its power to regulate quality. Unlike the
earlier compliance documents, the 2000 Nursing Home Compliance
Guidance identifies improving "Quality of Care"-not billing compli-
ance-as the primary goal of any active compliance plan:
The OIG believes that a nursing facility's compliance policies
should start with a statement that affirms the facility's com-
mitment to providing the care and services necessary to attain
or maintain the resident's "highest practicable physical,
mental and psychosocial well being." To achieve the goal of
providing quality care, nursing facilities should continually
measure their performance against comprehensive standards
that... must include Medicare requirements.81
The 2008 Draft OIG Supplemental Compliance Program Guid-
ance for Nursing Facilities goes even further, stating that facilities
which do not meet the Federal government's view of "quality" "risk
becoming the target of governmental investigations. 8 2 The areas of
particular concern listed by the OIG focus almost exclusively on qual-
ity of care issues, such as the need for "comprehensive [resident] care
78 Id. at 8988.
79 Id. at 8990.
80 Id. In essence, the OIG devoted a single sentence in the Compliance
Program Guidance for Hospitals to quality issues by identifying the provision of
medicalli unnecessary services as one of 18 areas "of special concern."
OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Nursing Facilities, 65 Fed. Reg.
14,289, 14,293 (Mar. 16, 2000) (footnotes omitted).
82 73 Fed. Reg. 20,680, 20,684 (Apr. 16, 2008).
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plans," "sufficient staffing," "medication management" and "resident
safety." 83  Failure to meet these requirements, the Guidance high-
lights, exposes the facility to prosecution for civil or criminal billing
fraud. The need to submit "accurate claims," in contrast, is relegated
to three paragraphs in a 17 page document.
The government has had mixed success in its efforts to federalize
quality of care standards using federal fraud statutes. On one hand,
the "worthless service" theory has been validated by courts, but the
standard it imposes, i.e., the services must be so deficient as to equate
with "no service," protects all but the most deficient of healthcare
providers. On the other hand, providers can take solace in the fact
that the "express" and "implied" false certification theories appear to
have been largely discredited. The current stasis, however, may be
the proverbial calm before the storm. The pay for performance
movement promises to fundamentally change the way in which
healthcare providers are reimbursed. More ominously for healthcare
providers, pay for performance as currently envisioned will most like-
ly have the unintended consequence of revitalizing both the FCA and
dramatically expanding the Federal government's power to
impose national standards of care.
IV. THE FEDERALIZATION OF QUALITY PART TWO:
PAY FOR PERFORMANCE
The principal that the Federal government can use its authority
under the FCA and related fraud statutes to "regulate" quality of care
is now well-established. Less certain is how the burgeoning pay for
performance trend, also known as "Value Based Purchasing" will
affect the risk environment for healthcare providers. Although pay for
performance is in its infancy, it has all the hallmarks of a trend that is
likely to grow to the point that a sizable portion of future reimburse-
ments will likely be tied directly to quality measurements.8 4
83 Id.
84 See The National Committee for Quality Health Care, Hospital CEO
Guide to Pay for Performance, available at http://www.leapfroggroup.org/
for hospitals/CEOGuide For P4P (according to the National Committee for Quality
Healthcare, there are already over ninety pay for performance projects being spon-
sored nationwide by private payors). The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
("CMS") has announced 5 Value Based Purchasing demonstration projects. See
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Medicare Demonstrations,
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/DemoProjectsEvalRpts/MD/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2009).
First, CMS created a project covering hospitals, known as the "Premier Hospital
Quality Incentive Demonstration." Id. See also infra note 87 and accompanying text.
Additionally, CMS created the following projects: Large Physician groups ("Medi-
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Pay for performance is based on the commonsense notion that
giving providers more money for providing excellent care will result
in an overall improvement in the quality of care being given.85 The
philosophy behind pay for performance was described in detail in
three reports prepared by the Institute of Medicine at the National
Academies ("IOM"), which had been retained by CMS to perform a
study to explore the weaknesses in the current Medicare program.
86
The third of these reports, entitled "Rewarding Provider Performance:
Aligning Incentives in Medicare" (the "IOM Report"), discussed in
detail the need to institute programs that wedded reimbursement rates
to the quality of healthcare services being provided. 7 In essence, pay
for performance is a strategy designed to create incentives for provid-
ers to deliver higher quality of care as measured by selected objective
and subjective standards.
The IOM Report identified two steps in creating an effective pay
for performance program. First, there needs to be enough data
collected and available to define the quality criteria upon which reim-
bursement will ultimately be based. Second, that data must be
normalized in a fashion that allows for logical distinctions in payment
levels among competing facilities. The government is well along the
path of establishing and measuring quality criteria, at least in the
hospital industry. Two hospital based programs, the "Reporting
Hospital Quality Data for Annual Payment Update" ("RHQDAPU")
and the "Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and
care Physician Group Practice Demonstration"); Small to medium physician offices
("Medicare Care Management Performance Demonstration"); Nursing Homes
("Nursing Home Value-Based Purchasing"); and Home Health Agencies ("Home
Health Pay for Performance Demonstration"). Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services, supra.
85 Proponents of the pay for performance movement argue that it will both
improve quality and result in substantial savings. E.g., PREMIER, EXPLORING THE
NEXUS OF QUALITY AND COST: METHODOLOGY AND PRELIMINARY FINDINGS passim
(2006), available at http://www.premierinc.com/p4p/press/quality-cost-methods-
paper3.pdf. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, RE-WARDING PROVIDER PERFORMANCE:
ALIGNING INCENTIVES IN MEDICARE, Sept. 21, 2006, at 7, available at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?recordid= 11723 (hereinafter REWARDING PROVIDER
PERFORMANCE) (noting that the "reward pool" might require the investment of sub-
stantial overnment funds to create a sufficient financial incentive).
16 See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, REWARDING PROVIDER PERFORMANCE, supra
note 85. See also Institute of Medicine, MEDICARE'S QUALITY IMPROVEMENT
ORGANIZATION PROGRAM: MAXIMIZING POTENTIAL, Mar. 9, 2006, available at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?recordid=l 1604, see INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE,
PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT: ACCELERATING IMPROVEMENT, Dec. 1, 2005, avail-
able at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?recordid=l 1517.
87 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, REWARDING PROVIDER PERFORMANCE, supra note
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Systems" ("HCAHPS"), have given us a glimpse of the future of pay
for performance. The RHQDAPU, adopted as part of the 2003 Medi-
care Modernization Act, "encourages hospitals" to submit data on a
series of specific quality measures, including myocardial infarction,
heart failure, surgical care, and pneumonia. Hospitals that do not
participate in the program receive a 2.0% reduction in their annual
Medicare payments. This data, in turn, is made available to the public
through the internet.88
Similar data is also being collected for Skilled Nursing Facilities
through the so-called Nursing Home Quality Initiative ("NHQI").
The purpose of the NHQI, according to the Center for Medicare and
Medicaid Services, is to provide consumers with enough information
to make informed choices regarding nursing home services. 89 The
NHQI relies on data collected by nursing homes as part of their
quarterly obligation to assess patients. The program currently uses 19
measurements, known as the "Minimum Data Set," to measure
quality. This information, along with staffing levels and the results of
recent state surveys, is then made available for review by patients and
families on the Department of Health and Human Services "Nursing
Home Compare" website. 90
The RHQDAPU and NHQI rely on "objective" data as a measure
of quality. The recently expanded HCAHPS program, in contrast, is
the government's first foray into using subjective criteria as a measure
of quality. 91 The HCAHPS program, initially launched in October of
2006, "encourages" hospitals to survey patients on 18 items that
encompass virtually every aspect of their hospitalization. 92  The
subjective nature of the survey is evident from the questions it asks.
Patients are asked, for example, "How often did nurses treat you with
courtesy and respect?" and directed to rate their experience at the
hospital on a "1 to 10" scale.
93
88 Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Reporting Hospital Quality
Data for Annual Payment Update, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/HospitalQuality
Inits/08 HospitalRHQDAPU.asp (last visited Jan. 6, 2009).
-9 See Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Nursing Home Quality
Initiatives: Overview, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/NursingHomeQualityInits/ (last
visited Jan. 6, 2009).
90 HHS.gov, Nursing Home Compare, http://www.medicare.gov/NH
Compare/Home.asp (last visited Feb. 1, 2009).
91 The HCHAPS program is described in detail at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/
hospitalqualityinits/30 hospitalhcahps.asp.
92 CAHPS Hospital Survey Instrument (2007), available at http://
www.hcahpsonline.org/Files/Appendix%20D%20-%20CAHPS%20Hospital%20
Survey%20(English).pdf.
9' id. at 1.
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Training on the program took place in January of 2008. Hospitals
that choose to not participate will have their "Average Patient Unit"
("APU"), a measurement used in establishing reimbursement rates,
cut by 2%. Like the RHQDAPU and the NHQI, CMS intends to post
the results once a statistically significant amount of data is collected.94
How the data will ultimately be used to drive payment determina-
tions is still an open question, but a potential preview can be derived
from the ongoing Premier/Hospital Quality Improvement
Demonstration Program ("HQID").95 This project, which was first
launched in 2003 by CMS, currently involves more than 260 hospi-
tals. Initially, the program merely collected and reported quality data
on a series of nationally recognized quality indicators. In late 2005,
however, CMS allocated $8.85 million in "incentive payments" for
the top performing hospitals. Last year, hospitals in the top 10% of
quality indicators received a 2% bonus payment, while those in the
second decile received a 1% increase. 96
The impact of the Premier project in its first two years was rather
benign. Hospitals that reported lower quality were not punished.
Starting this year, however, hospitals in the lower 20% will receive a
payment penalty that matches the incentive payment given to the
highest performing facilities.97
The sponsors of the HQID program have essentially declared
victory. According to January 31, 2008 report issued by Premier, the
median hospital cost per patient among participating hospitals
94 Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, HCAHPS: Patients' Perspec-
tives of Care Survey, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/hospitalqualityinits/30_hospitalhcahps.
asp (last visited Jan. 6, 2009).
95 CMS recently completed a related test pay-for performance program for
Physicians, known as the "Physician Group Practice Demonstration Project."
MICHAEL 0. LEAVIrr, HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, REPORT TO CONGRESS:
PHYSICIAN GROUP PRACTICE DEMONSTRATION FIRST EVALUATION REPORT (2006),
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/DemoProjectsEvalRpts/downloads/PGPFinalCongress.pdf
Ten large physician groups, representing 5,000 physicians and 220,000 Medicare
patients, participate in the project. Id. at 1. Using a complicated formula, CMS paid
a bonus "performance payment" to groups that successfully improved patient quality
while holding down program costs. Id. at 1-2. Thirty-two objective quality meas-
urements were chosen for the pilot study. Id at 4. A final report on the study has not
yet been published.
96 PREMIER, INC., CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES (CMS) ]
PREMIER HOSPITAL QUALITY INCENTIVE DEMONSTRATION PROJECT: PROJECT
OVERVIEW AND FINDINGS FROM YEAR ONE 4 (2006), available at
http://www.premierinc.com/quality-safety/tools-services/p4p/hqi/hqi-whitepaper
041306.pdf.V7 Premier, Inc., Overview of CMS Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstra-
tion Project Payment Method, http://www.premierinc.com/quality-safety/tools-
services/p4p/hqi/payment/project-payment-year5.jsp (last visited Jan. 12, 2009).
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declined over $1,000, while the median mortality rate decreased by
1.87%. Premier claims that expanding the program nationwide will
result in over 70,000 fewer fatalities and aggregate cost savings in
excess of $4.5 billion.98 As a result, in June of 2008 the Center for
Medicare Services reported that it was going to extend the program by
an additional three years. 99
The purported success of the Premier Demonstration Project
makes its expansion almost a foregone conclusion. 100 In the very near
future, quality reporting requirements are going to increase. Perhaps
more ominously, payment decisions are going to be increasingly
based on the data being reported. As stated by the American Medical
Association in a 2004 report, "pay for performance is a Tsunami
building offshore in a sea of stakeholder unrest, threatening those who
are not prepared." 101
The purported success of the HQID program has not gone unno-
ticed in other segments of the industry. In June of 2006, to cite one
example, a CMS sponsored study prepared by ABT Associates enti-
tled Quality Monitoring for Medicare Global Payment Demonstra-
tions: Nursing Home Quality Based Purchasing Demonstration
described in detail the steps CMS could take to implement a nursing
home pay for performance system.10 2 First, the report recommended
that four measurements be used to establish a baseline upon which
reimbursement could be based:
(1) Nursing home staffing (staffing level and nursing staff
turnover);
98 Press Release, Premier, Inc., Hospital Quality Improving, Cost, Mortality
Rate Trends Declining for Participants in Medicare Pay-for-Performance Project (Jan.
31, 2008), available at http://premierinc.com/about/news/08-jan/performance-pays-
2.jsp.
99 Premier, Inc., Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration: Reward-
ing Superior Quality Care (June 2008), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/
HospitalQualitylnits/Downloads/HospitalPremierFactSheet2008O6.pdf.
100 A study comparing hospitals that participated in the HQID and those that
merely reported quality data, published in the New England Journal of Medicine,
reported that pay for performance only resulted in "modest[]" improvement and rec-
ommended that additional research be performed before pay for performance is more
broadly implemented. Peter K Lindenauer et al., Public Reporting and Pay for Per-
formance in Hospital Quality Improvement, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 486, 495
(2007).
101 AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PAY FOR PERFORMANCE: A
PHYSICIAN'S GUIDE TO EVALUATING INCENTIVE PLANS (2004).
102 ALAN WHITE ET AL., ABT ASSOCIATES INC., QUALITY MONITORING FOR
MEDICARE GLOBAL PAYMENT DEMONSTRATIONS: NURSING HOME QUALITY-BASED




(2) Rate of potentially avoidable hospitalizations;
(3) MDS-based resident outcome measures; and
(4) Outcomes from state survey inspections.'0 3
The proposal to use "potentially avoidable hospitalizations" and
the "MDS-based resident outcome measures," if implemented, would
greatly expand the government's ability to "federalize" quality of care
standards. As to the former, the report identifies "congestive heart
failure, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease ...and urinary tract
infection" as three conditions that are "largely avoidable with appro-
priate outpatient care."104 In terms of the MDS measurements, the
report concludes that the level of payment to nursing homes should
turn, in part, on their ability to control "pressure sores," the use of
catheters, physical restraints and bladder incontinence. 10 5 In essence,
adoption of the ABT report would result in the creation of a national
standard upon which payment would be made based on these and oth-
er related quality measurements. The difference between a "high
quality" nursing home and a "negligent" nursing home would no
longer be measured exclusively by state survey results, but rather on
how well the facility was able to keep people out of the hospital.
Having established a baseline "quality of care," the report goes on
to suggest that nursing home rankings in the top 20% of the quality
measures should qualify for a performance payment, as well as the
20% of nursing homes who best improve their performance over a
years time.10 6 Although the proposal does not call for a reimburse-
ment cut for lower performing facilities, the experience from the
HQID demonstration project suggests that such a "penalty" will
ultimately become part of the program.
There is a great deal of momentum to implement these kinds of
pay for performance programs. As stated by CMS's then Acting
Administrator, Kerry Weems:
Posting the poor performing nursing homes on our website
was not an isolated activity, but just one milestone in a year-
long, special effort to move nursing homes forward on qual-
ity. It includes a pay-for-performance initiative for nursing
homes, a pilot demonstrating a comprehensive system of
criminal and other background checks for prospective new-
103 Id. at i.
'04 Id. at ii.
'05 Id. at iii.
'06 Id. at v.
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hires in nursing homes, and strengthened surveillance of in-
fection control and nutrition in nursing homes.1
0 7
The signs could not be clearer: The Federal government is going
to increasingly define for nursing homes, hospitals and physicians the
quality of care they must provide in order to receive full payment.
Perhaps more importantly, facilities and physicians that fail to meet
those standards are going to be increasingly exposed to malpractice
claims, civil billing fraud claims and even criminal "fraud" prosecu-
tions. 108
V. THE MARRIAGE OF COMPLIANCE AND
QUALITY WILL HAVE FAR REACHING
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
HEALTHCARE INDUSTRY
The trends identified above present serious legal and organiza-
tional challenges for healthcare providers. In terms of the former, the
combination of pay for performance and the federalization of quality
standards will likely have the effect of revitalizing the FCA as a tool
to impose a uniform, federally created standard of care. This, in turn,
will greatly expand the Federal government's ability to prosecute enti-
107 Kerry Weems, Acting Adm'r, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services,
Speech to JP Morgan Health Care Conference: The CMS Forecast for 2008 (Jan. 9,
2008), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/apps/media/press/speech.asp.
108 CMS's efforts to federalize quality standards is also evidenced by the fact
that CMS is considering imposing specific credentialing requirements for reimburse-
ment of certain highly technical procedures. In the area of artificial hearts, to cite one
example, CMS has imposed a rule requiring, as a condition of payment, that "at least
one member of the [ventricular assist device] team ... [have] experience implanting
at least 10 [devices] ... over the course of the previous 36 months...." CENTERS FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, MEDICARE NATIONAL COVERAGE DETERMINATIONS
MANUAL: CHAPTER 1, PART 1 (SECTIONS 10 - 80.12): COVERAGE DETERMINATIONS
(2008), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/manuals/downloads/ncdl03cl_
Partl.pdf. The rule further requires the facility to be a member of the "Interagency
Registry for Mechanically Assisted Circulatory Support" group and be credentialed
by the Joint Commission. Id. Imposing direct credentialing requirements as a condi-
tion of payment further blurs the lines between risk, compliance, and quality. As
common sense would suggest, having unqualified doctors perform services raises
obvious risk (i.e. litigation) and quality issues. Under the new regime, however, it
also potentially implicates serious compliance concerns if services provided by "un-
der-credentialed" doctors are billed. Even if a facility deems a physician to be quali-
fied to provide a particular service, billing that service is illegal if the physician does
not meet the differing standards imposed by the federal government. If this trend
continues, a single, "one size fits all" federal standard, will increasingly supplant the
role of states and private credentialing bodies.
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ties that fail to meet whatever standard of a care is ultimately im-
posed.
A. The Revitalization of the FCA as a Tool
to Impose Quality Standards.
Under the current regime, the potential for criminal or even civil
exposure for reporting false data is limited. In terms of the FCA, the
current weight of authority does not allow for imposition of liability
for submitting false quality data that is not directly related to payment.
This much is evident from the plain language of the Act. The first
section of the Act prohibits only a "false claim" for reimbursement.
Reporting false quality data unrelated to a "claim" for reimbursement
simply does not violate the act. 109 The second section of the Act for-
bids the submission or creation of a false record or statement to get a
false or fraudulent payment from the Federal government. Again,
when "quality" and "payment" are divorced, reporting quality data has
nothing to do with "getting" a government payment."'
But tying payment to the data being reported dramatically
increases both the incentive to falsely report and the danger in doing
so. The former is obvious. When payment is directly tied to the data
being reported, facilities have an additional incentive to misrepresent
that data in a fashion that will lead to higher reimbursement. This was
in many ways the lesson of the corporate scandals of the early 2000's,
where numerous companies reported higher than actual earnings be-
cause the compensation paid to management was often tied directly to
what was reported."'
Pay for performance will breathe new life into both the express
and implied theories of liability to the point that they will merge into a
single viable theory of recovery. In terms of the former, CMS has
every reason as part of any pay for performance system to amend the
certification requirements to make explicit that the "condition(s) of
109 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Bonin v. Cmty. Care Ctr. of St. Martinville,
LLC, No. 05-1005, 2008 WL 2113055, at *11-15 (W.D. La. May 16, 2008) (holding
a facility was not liable for a "false certification claim" under the False Claims Act
for false information contained in Minimum Data Sheets because payment is not
conditioned on the data).
110 See e.g., Allison Engine Co. v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 2123, 2126 (2008)
(submitting false quality data by subcontractor to government contractor is not a false
claim because the purpose of submission is not "to get" payment directly from the
government).
11 See MARIANNE M. JENNINGS, THE SEVEN SIGNS OF ETHicAL COLLAPSE:
How TO SPOT MORAL MELTDOWNS IN COMPANIES... BEFORE IT'S Too LATE (2006)
(summarizing how the relationship between financial reporting and economic incen-
tives resulted in widespread corporate fraud).
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payment" include an express requirement that the underlying quality
data upon which payment is premised is accurate. Indeed, the current
CMS draft of the MDS 3.0 reporting tool already contains such a
certification:
I certify that the accompanying information accurately
reflects resident assessment information for this resident and
that I collected or coordinated collection of this information
on the dates specified .... I understand that this information is
used as a basis for ensuring that residents receive appropriate
and quality care, and as a basis for payment from federal
funds. 112
The inclusion of this language in the reporting tool is essentially
an effort by the government to codify the position it took in United
States ex rel. Thompson v Columbia/HCA Healthcare; a position that
was subsequently rejected in Mike ex rel. Strauss. As of today, this
language alone should not be enough to impose liability under the
express certification because it is simply not true. 13 With the excep-
tion of hospitals participating in the HQID project, quality data and
the quality of services being provided simply do not currently play
any role in reimbursement decisions.' 
14
Under a pay for performance system, in contrast, quality data also
becomes highly relevant to reimbursement decisions. By definition,
facilities will be required to submit quality data to the government to
qualify for higher-or to avoid lower-levels of reimbursement.
Thus, the quality data becomes a "false record" necessary "to get" a
"claim paid" under the second provision of the FCA. ll5 A similar
analysis applies to the "materiality" requirement imposed by most
other federal fraud statutes. Under pay for performance, quality data
is not only "material" to the government's reimbursement decision, it
is in many ways the most critical element of any claim made for reim-
bursement. Direct liability under the FCA for reporting false quality
112 DEBRA SALIBA & JOAN BUCHANAN, RAND HEALTH CORP., DEVELOPMENT
& VALIDATION OF A REVISED NURSING HOME ASSESSMENT TOOL: MDS 3.0, at 10
(2008), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/NursingHomeQualitylnits/Downloads/
MDS30FinalReport.pdf (emphasis added).
113 See e.g., Bonin, 2008 WL 2113055 (dismissing a false certification claim
where defendants allegedly forged MDS's; but allowing other theories under the
False Claims Act to proceed). Cf United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601-02,
627 (2000) (explaining that Congress's assertion of authority in a given area is not
proof that Congress possesses actual authority, derived from the Constitution).
114 See supra Part III.C.
115 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) (2000).
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data arises from the fact that the data is now relevant to both "getting"
a payment from the Government and becomes an integral part of a
false claimfor reimbursement.
Pay for performance could also lead to the reinvigoration of the
currently discredited "implied" certification theory. Quality data
serves two functions under a pay for performance regime. It contin-
ues to serve the traditional role of assuring that the facility meets its
conditions of participation. But the data also (arguably) becomes the
"deciding factor" in making reimbursement decisions. To paraphrase,
a facility submitting data under the current system is essentially
making the statement: "For purposes of determining whether this
facility should be allowed to participate in the Medicare system we
hereby certify that we achieved the following quality standards."
When reimbursement is based on the level of quality, this changes to
the "implied" statement: "The government should pay us 'X' dollars
because we achieved the following quality standards."
Quality data is only relevant today to the government's determina-
tion of whether a particular facility is "substantially" in compliance
with the conditions of participation. Pay for performance requires
quality data to be accurate so the government can make the "correct"
reimbursement decision on every claim submitted by a facility. Tying
payment decisions directly to the quality of care being provided will
have the unintended consequence of giving the Federal government a
powerful tool under the FCA and Medicare Fraud statute to impose
national quality of care standards.
The revitalization of federal fraud statutes, combined with pay for
performance, will also result in a diminished role for the states and
private credentialing agencies. Reimbursement under all pay for per-
formance schemes currently envisioned is determined in relationship
to the quality of care provided by other similarly situated entitities.
Thus, under the Premier/HQID program, additional payment is given
to the top 20% of participating facilities as measured against the other
facilities participating in the program." 6 A facility operating under
such a scheme has every economic incentive to pour its limited re-
sources into improving its quality in the areas selected by the Federal
government that will result in higher payments, instead of dedicating
resources towards meeting the more objective standards set by state
licensing agencies or private credentialing agencies.
This focus, in turn, will give the Federal government a reason to
constantly expand the list of quality measures it considers important
for the purpose of establishing reimbursement levels. This expansion
116 See PREMIER, supra note 85.
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has already occurred in the RHQDAPU program. In 2005, the
program started with 10 quality measures. This grew to 21 measured
parameters in 2007. The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services
initially proposed a total of 30 measurements for 2009, ballooning to
72 measurements in 2010. After strong criticism, CMS compromised
by imposing "only" 42 measurements for 2010, but the trend is
unmistakable.1 7  As pay for performance grows, so too will the
Federal government's role in defining quality of care.
B. The Organizational Impact of "Pay for Performance"
and the Federalization of Quality
Few healthcare facilities are prepared for the federalization of
quality.118 As discussed in detail above, the organizational structure
of most large healthcare entities continues to reflect the limited role
historically played by the Federal government in regulating quality of
care. Under the historic model, billing and quality issues could be
easily and logically categorized. A malpractice claim, governed by
state law, was the responsibility of the risk manager and/or quality
assessment committee. A claim of improper billing, governed by
federal law, was the responsibility of the compliance officer. But in a
world where the failure to provide adequate care affects both the
amount of money the facility is paid and potentially raises criminal
billing fraud concerns, the two functions essentially are merged.
This "merger" is perhaps best illustrated by example. Posit a
mythical non-profit integrated health system, "Enormous Healthcare,
Inc." ("Enormous").
Enormous operates a main hospital campus, a separate Long
Term Care Facility, a half dozen urgent care centers, a
"CORF," a rehabilitation facility, and a home health agency.
Like most healthcare organizations, Enormous has a compre-
hensive compliance plan, codes of conduct, and a mission
statement. And, like most health care organizations, Enor-
mous has divided the risk, quality, revenue and compliance
functions among a series of independent departments,
including:
117 IOWA FOUND. FOR MED. CARE, QUALITY IMPROVEMENT ORG. SUPPORT CTR.
FOR THE Hosp. REPORTING PROGRAM, REPORTING HOSPITAL QUALITY DATA FOR
ANNUAL PAYMENT UPDATE, RHQDAPU MEASURES FOR FY 20 10.
118 Portions of the following material are adapted from Devin S. Schindler,
Quality of Care Initiatives: Malpractice and Pay for Performance, 9 COMPLIANCE
TODAY MAGAZINE 4, November 2007.
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1) A Compliance Department, which is responsible for pre-
venting the submission of erroneous claims for payment and
unlawful or noncompliant conduct involving federal and state
healthcare programs.
2) A Risk Manager and associated Risk Department which
are primarily concerned with managing and preventing mal-
practice claims.
3) A Finance Department managed by the Chief Financial
Officer, which is primarily concerned with revenue generation
and cost-control.
4) A Medical Director who chairs the Peer Review Commit-
tee. Like most peer review committees, Enormous' commit-
tee is the body with primary responsibility for credentialing
and disciplining the medical staff.
5) The Quality and Utilization Department. As required by
federal law, Enormous' utilization committee is responsible
for "review(ing) professional services provided, to determine
medical necessity"." 9 The "quality" side of the department is
responsible for analyzing overall trends in the hospital that
could affect patient mortality or morbidity.
Historically, there was little reason for the "compliance" and
"revenue" functions to interact with the "risk" and "quality" functions.
The results of annual surveys or quality of care investigations would
be cycled to the Quality Committee. Malpractice claims were under
the jurisdiction of the risk manager and, in well managed facilities, the
Peer Review Committee. Compliance with billing and reimbursement
issues was monitored by the compliance manager. Under the historic
model of healthcare regulation, there was no reason or incentive for
"compliance" and "finance" to become actively involved in quality
issues.
The merger of "reimbursement" and quality, both through the use
of FCA as a basis for enforcement actions against entities that provide
low quality care and the pay for performance initiatives, fundamen-
tally changes this historic model. Consider the following hypothetical
example:
The year is 2012 and Enormous is struggling. The (fictional)
CMS pay for performance heart stenting rules provide for a
5% payment reduction if a facility falls below certain quality
standards. A review by Enormous' Revenue Department
"9 42 C.F.R. § 482.30(f) (2007).
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suggests that the facility is close to triggering the payment
cut. The quality standards upon which payment is based have
a strong subjective element related to the patient's perceived
recovery. The Revenue Department's review suggests that
part of the problem may result from an unwritten policy of the
"Big Heart" cardiology group, which thinks that the solution
to all heart problems is stenting. As a result, this group ar-
guably "over prescribes" the procedure, which, in turn, has
the effect of lowering the overall quality measurements as a
result of complications and a substantial number of patients
who do not report any relief following the procedure.
An unrelated review by the Quality Department reveals that
several of the physicians employed by "Big Heart" have not
received the training required under the government's new
(fictional) coverage requirements. This combination of fac-
tors has also resulted in a higher than expected number of
malpractice complaints, which is noted by the Risk Depart-
ment. The Peer Review Committee has reviewed and ap-
proved Big Heart's practice pattern, citing a report by the
manufacturer of stents used by the practice.
The Revenue Department is concerned about the potential re-
imbursement cut but does not want to alienate "Big Heart"
because the practice is a major revenue source for the hospi-
tal. It instructs the Quality Department to err on the side of
reporting a "favorable" outcome anytime the subjective crite-
ria could arguably justify such a finding. As a result, the 2011
and 2012 quality reports are dramatically better than the 2010
report, where more stringent internal standards were utilized
for determining a "favorable" outcome. Enormous is ulti-
mately paid the full rate by Medicare for these procedures.
Who is responsible for solving this problem? Certainly, the
Quality Department has a role. Patient quality is potentially suffering
and the trends need to be analyzed. Risk Management has a role in
defending the malpractice suits; as does Peer Review. The most
important player, however, is the Compliance Department. Under the
new system, the Company faces substantial civil and even criminal
exposure. Knowingly reporting false data to the government under
the new regime gives rise to both criminal and civil liability.' 20 The
120 See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 1035 (2000).
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Revenue Department would argue, of course, that it did not "know-
ingly" report false data because its interpretation of the regulations
allowed it to give the hospital the "benefit of the doubt" when a
quality indicator fell within a gray area.
So who really is responsible for handling this problem? One risk
is that the various departments respond without careful deliberation
and coordination. This increases the risk of enforcement activity
because the "solution" implemented by management to solve the
revenue issue may be contrary to the wishes of the Quality Committee
and the steps being taken by the Compliance Department to keep the
facility in compliance with the reimbursement statutes. Before long, a
prosecutor's case is made for him as the various departments point
fingers.
VI. DEFENDING HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS
IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM
The entities that will prosper under the new regime are those that
best integrate the risk, revenue, quality and compliance functions.
There is no single "right" solution because healthcare facilities have
differing goals, culture, and competitive pressures. Still, facilities
could benefit from performing a comprehensive review of how well
they respond to risk, quality and compliance issues that cut across
institutional lines. The adage "an ounce of prevention is worth a
pound of cure" applies equally to medicine and law. Among the
issues that can (and should) be considered include:
A. Revitalize the Existing Compliance Committee or Create
a Multidisciplinary Team to Foster Change
Most healthcare facilities have implemented the various antifraud
measures recommended by the Program Compliance Guidance
documents promulgated by CMS, including creation of compliance
committees, implementing educational programs and designating a
compliance officer. A properly structured compliance committee that
has been given a modicum of discretion can be an extremely useful
tool to implement comprehensive strategies for responding to poten-
tial risk, quality, and compliance issues. The effectiveness of any
committee turns on several variables. First, a committee that is not
staffed with active, high level representatives of each department will
be ineffective. The convergence of pay for performance and the cri-
minalization of malpractice are going to require substantive changes
in organizations that wish to prosper. A committee whose member-
ship does not include the facilities' actual decision makers will be
unable to execute the policies that need to be implemented.
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An effective compliance committee will need the authority and
tools necessary to implement structural change. In simple terms, to be
effective the committee needs to be able to make policy and require
individual departments to comply with those policies. The compli-
ance committee (or its equivalent) should evolve from its historic ad-
visory role to a fully empowered legislative body with the authority to
make policy and punish transgressors.
B. Share Information
Data that might formerly concern only one department under the
historic model now has relevancy to all departments involved in the
risk, quality and compliance functions. A disproportionate number of
rejected claims received by the revenue department might be the sign
of a serious underlying quality or compliance problem. A healthcare
provider experiencing an excessive number of malpractice claims, or
patient complaints, likely raises risk, quality and compliance issues.
In the world of pay for performance, "compliance problems" often-
times masquerade as "revenue" or "quality" problems. Without an
active sharing of information across the facility, the compliance
department may not discover the problem until the government has
already instituted enforcement activities.
Databases tracking malpractice claims, payment trends and
quality measurements should be made available across departmental
lines. Compliance and risk teams should be active participants in the
day-to-day operations of the revenue team. Most importantly, each
department head should be sensitized to the fact that an issue that may
have historically "belonged" to their department might in fact need to
be shared with others.
C. Start Planning Today
More so than many of the other initiatives that have washed over
the healthcare field over the last twenty years, the federalization of
quality standards and pay for performance cannot be handled in a va-
cuum. All aspects of management-from revenue to compliance to
quality-are implicated. And, to be successful, all must be actively
involved in the planning process. Facilities should begin today to
reconsider how they both insure and document the quality of the
services they provide.
VII. CONCLUSION
The government and other third party payors are incrementally
changing the rules of engagement with the facilities that depend on its
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money to survive. Too many facilities will respond by trying to
compartmentalize their response to a subset of the departments
involved in risk, quality, and compliance issues. Facilities should
start evolving now, or risk finding themselves extinct.
